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INTRODUCTION
Scholars have only recently started to address repatriation and 
population return as an inherently political process. Influenced by 
growing criticism on socio-economic and aid-centric approaches, 
researchers have contributed to mostly top-down but also 
increasingly bottom-up analyses of ‘the politics of return’ (Tegenbos 
& Vlassenroot 2018: 19-21). To this day, we continue to have little 
understanding of the political impacts of population return in 
contexts of conflict and displacement, both from the perspective of 
countries of origin and (former) exile. This paper aims to contribute 
to this emerging debate on the political dimensions of return by 
focusing on the sudden ‘spontaneous’ return of 11,6001 Congolese 
refugees who were forced back from exile in South Sudan to their 
home areas in Faradje, in northeast DRC.
 Clashes between government and opposition forces in 
the vicinity of Nyori Refugee Camp compromised the safety of 
many Congolese residents, forcing many of them to return home.2 
In 2009, approximately 12,000 Congolese from Faradje territory 
had taken flight from the DRC to Nyori, in South Sudan’s Central 
Equatoria region, following violent attacks and atrocities committed 
by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).3 This paper argues for 
the need to better understand the politics of return in contexts of 
continued displacement in light of changing (geographical) political 
configurations of power and authority that are embedded into 
broader realities of increased humanitarian presence and cross-border 
movements. In this way, the paper also demonstrates how people, 
institutions, and authorities impacted by and operating within 
contexts of displacement and return contest and negotiate authority 
as well as their positions on the ground.
 The territory of Faradje lies in DRC’s Haut-Uélé province, 
formerly known as Province Orientale until 2015. The LRA crossed 
over from South(ern) Sudan and northern Uganda, where the origins 
of the movement lie, to northeast DRC in 2005.4 The LRA initially 
settled in Garamba National Park5 in 2005 but didn’t start carrying 
out attacks until December 2007 and, more severely, sparked off a 
series of violent attacks from Christmas eve 2008 onwards, notably 
in the territories of Dungu, Niangara, Faradje and Watsa (Durba), 
in the current Haut-Uélé province (then Province Orientale). Faradje 
was hit most severely in 2008-2009, most acutely following reprisal 
attacks conducted against civilians following “Operation Lightning 
Thunder,” a joint military operation between Uganda, southern 
Sudan, DRC, and CAR, and backed by the United States (HRW 
2009; Titeca & Costeur 2014).6 Abductions and violent attacks 
resulted in massive displacement across the region, emptying entire 
villages. In the years after mid-2010, this violence started decreasing 
as the LRA went into “survival mode” and gradually moved their 
activities to the Central African Republic and Sudan (Titeca 2019: 
219). Respondents for this research criticized the inability of local 
authorities to protect civilians. Others noted instances in which 
the Congolese army arrived late and committed abuses against 
populations already under attack by the LRA.7 
 This paper focuses on the situation of returnees in 
the town of Aba, close to the South Sudanese border, and its 
surrounding chefferies (Logo Ogambi, Logo Lolia, Mondo Missa, 
Kakwa, Logo Bagela), complemented with insights from Faradje 
town and Kurukwata, all situated in the territory of Faradje. Most 
of the returnees in these areas had fled in 2009 to Nyori Refugee 
Camp in southern Sudan. Others had sought safety internally in 
DRC, in neighbouring Ituri province, or closer to home, in camps 
for internally displaced people (IDPs) in Aba, Djabir, Kurukwata, 
and Faradje, where many still reside today. Most of the internally 
displaced from Ituri province returned to larger towns in Faradje 
territory in 2010 when there was a perception of better security. 
This paper focuses specifically on refugee return, its political impact 
in Faradje and its profound embeddedness within a broader reality 
of (protracted) displacement and return of various populations, 
as well as in broader forms of cross-border and internal migration 
characterizing the borderlands between South Sudan and DRC.8
 In the following sections, we will discuss the political 
impact of return in Aba and the broader territory of Faradje through 
three main, connecting themes: the politics of return; the politics 
of assistance; and changing political constellations. The first section 
will focus on the political failure of organizing official repatriation 
for Congolese before 2016 and its impact on returnees and political 
realities after return. The second section addresses the impact of 
the increased humanitarian presence and humanitarian structures 
of displacement on political dynamics in Faradje. The third and 
last section concentrates on how newly established political, 
humanitarian entities and spaces infringe on already existing forms 
of authority and legitimacy. Based on these three themes, we argue 
that the establishment of political/humanitarian structures during 
displacement have a continuous impact on the political situation 
in Faradje, and contribute to transforming issues of authority and 
legitimacy and changing political constellations.
 This research brief is one of the outputs of a research 
project that focused on the political dimensions of refugee return 
in three key areas: Faradje (DRC’s Haut-Uélé Province), Kalehe 
(DRC’s South Kivu Province) and Burundi. The project “Returning 
to Stability” was funded by NWO-WOTRO and resulted in a report 
and interactive map based on two months of fieldwork in each of 
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the research settings in 2019 by research teams based in the focus 
areas.9 For Faradje, we carried out a total of 57 interviews in addition 
to a number of field observations and documents gathered from 
humanitarian agencies, and the Congolese returnee and South 
Sudanese refugee committees. This paper is, therefore, a slightly 
adapted version of the Faradje case study in the report. All authors 
have participated to a greater or lesser extent in the fieldwork.
THE POLITICS OF RETURN
Discussions around a potential organized repatriation of Congolese 
refugees from Nyori preceded the eventual return of refugees to DRC 
in 2016. These discussions officially started in 2015 and involved 
local Congolese authorities, the DRC’s National Commission for 
Refugees (CNR), the South Sudanese Commission for Refugees 
(CRA) and UNHCR. In addition to sending a delegation in 2015 to 
visit the refugees in Nyori and gather information, potential sites were 
examined to settle landless returnees in Faradje.10 The preparations 
were put on hold in 2016 due to increased insecurity in South Sudan 
as the conflict between the government of South Sudan and the South 
Sudanese armed opposition escalated and spread to these Equatoria 
regions. This increased insecurity rendered repatriation logistically 
difficult. Insecurity in South Sudan in the form of violent attacks and 
increased penetration of armed actors in the camp directly reduced 
the safety of the refugees in Nyori. When the refugees eventually 
fled en masse back to DRC, Congolese authorities found themselves 
unprepared to receive, assist, and register them. Furthermore, they 
were accompanied by some 34,000 South Sudanese refugees who had 
also fled the upsurge in violence in the zone where Nyori camp was 
situated.11
 The absence of an official tripartite agreement (and of 
accompanying humanitarian assistance) was an issue much debated 
during interviews. Interviewees said they would have preferred to 
return in the framework of an agreement between UNHCR, the 
country of refugee origin (DRC), and the host country (South 
Sudan), because of its legal framework, but also for its links to 
assistance and an official transfer of responsibilities for the refugee 
returnees from the country of refuge to the country of origin. 
 An official of the CNR explained the relative disregard 
for returnees by saying that the legal vocabulary for displacement 
clearly distinguishes “repatriates who return to their country of 
origin through an official framework,” from “spontaneous repatriates 
who return on their own without any official measures.” The latter 
officially have no right to reintegration assistance.12 During field 
research, Congolese authorities and humanitarian actors recurrently 
used the phrase “ils sont rentrés chez eux” (they have returned home) 
to legitimate and justify their detachment towards the spontaneous 
repatriates under study.13 In Aba, the administrative, legal distinction 
between returnees whose repatriation is organized and those who 
repatriate spontaneously, translated itself into daily conversations 
(with returnees, Congolese authorities, humanitarians, CNR) as a 
distinction between “repatriates” (organized, right to assistance) and 
“returnees” (spontaneous, no right to assistance). The labeling of 
the population under study as “returnees” instead of “repatriates,” 
was in turn contested by the returnees themselves, who preferred to 
identify themselves as either “forced returnees” or “repatriates,” as a 
way of emphasizing what they claimed was their right to assistance 
and other forms of support from CNR and the humanitarian 
agencies.14 Frustration among returnees over the political failure in 
assisting the Congolese to repatriate was moreover aggravated by 
the fact that funding and humanitarian resources had been made 
available to accommodate South Sudanese refugees in Faradje’s newly 
established refugee site, Meri, as opposed to the Congolese returnees, 
many of whom had fled the same violence. The assistance received by 
returnees was very limited and depended much on returnees’ own 
lobbying at CNR and humanitarian agencies. Moreover, in 2017 the 
small number of food rations available for after the return were cut.15
 The organization of repatriation was, not only challenged 
by the 2016 violence in South Sudan but also by the process through 
which refugees and authorities from the country of refuge and 
origin negotiated population return. Interviews with returnees and 
customary chiefs revealed that the context in which these negotiations 
took place as well as political dynamics and power struggles between 
the refugee leadership and South Sudanese camp authorities in Nyori 
complicated the return process.
 Before the start of the more official discussions around 
organized return in 2015, Congolese state and customary authorities 
had visited Nyori on multiple occasions and were met with a welcome 
that was lukewarm at best, and often even hostile. Already in 2009, 
when the LRA was still carrying out violent attacks in the region, a 
customary chief of one of the chefferies around Aba traveled to South 
Sudan and requested that his constituencies return home. Current 
returnees who had met him at the time testified that the chief had 
lamented that he could not preside over an empty chefferie.16 His 
visit was met with outright rejection, and refugees chased him away. 
Current returnees interpreted the chief’s request as a way for him to 
further his political interests while downplaying the gravity of ongoing 
insecurity in the country.17 The chief himself thought he had taken a 
considerable risk in traveling to South Sudan, for which refugees had 
been ‘ungrateful.’18 As such, while all returnees lamented the lack of a 
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tripartite agreement for repatriation, this example demonstrates that 
refugee participation and agency in deciding the “when” and “how” 
of return is equally important.
 According to returnees, political dynamics and power 
struggles in Nyori between the refugee leadership and South Sudanese 
camp authorities also complicated the return process. Official visits to 
the refugees in 2012, by the governor of the then-Orientale Province 
(now Haut-Uélé, which includes Faradje), and the 2015 delegation (cf. 
supra) were used as illustrations of these political tensions. In the years 
preceding 2012 and in the course of the following years, the refugee 
leadership in Nyori wrote letters to Congolese authorities in DRC to 
request repatriation. However, according to former members of these 
successive refugee camp committees19 and a former CNR official, the 
camp authorities (i.e. CRA and UNHCR) wanted to keep refugees 
in South Sudan, “because of their economic interests linked with 
the refugee presence and incoming humanitarian resources.”20 To 
achieve that goal, the South Sudanese camp authorities had created a 
rift between Congolese refugees who preferred to remain in the camp 
and those who wanted to repatriate to DRC.21 In the course of this 
power struggle, the camp management suspended the elected refugee 
committee, who had supported repatriation, and replaced it with a 
committee that followed the management’s interests and advocated 
for a continuous stay in South Sudan. The committee appointed by 
the camp authorities eventually met with the governor of Orientale 
Province in 2012, and with the delegation of Congolese authorities 
and humanitarian officials in 2015.22 In their communications with 
the Congolese authorities during both events, the committee denied 
that refugees supported the idea of repatriation.23 UNHCR and 
Terre Sans Frontières (TSF) appeared to have no knowledge of the 
political dynamics that had influenced the reception of the Congolese 
authorities in Nyori.24
 These dynamics related to the politics of return continued 
to have an influence, despite the ‘spontaneous’ return of most 
Congolese refugees. Interviewees said that the remaining refugee 
committee in South Sudan, which had resisted return and is 
supported by the CRA, continues to attempt to exert influence over 
the returnees (cf. section politics of assistance). Several returnees said 
that South Sudan still claims responsibility for returnees to host them 
as refugees, provide assistance, etc. – a claim which was even accepted 
as legitimate by a CNR official, who explained that the Congolese 
never formally repatriated.25
THE POLITICS OF ASSISTANCE
The growing presence of a humanitarian apparatus in Faradje 
has had a profound impact on political realities. In response to 
large-scale internal displacement following the LRA incursions, 
humanitarian agencies arrived in large numbers and established 
themselves in domains such as education, health, protection, SGBV, 
livelihoods, food provision, construction, etc. Local NGOs such as 
the Association Pour la Promotion Rurale (APRu) and international 
ones like Invisible Children, Danish Refugee Council (DRC), 
Lutheran World Federation (LWF), and UNHCR settled themselves 
in Aba and its surroundings, and in and around IDP camps which 
were rapidly being created. The humanitarian presence decreased 
somewhat in later years and became less diverse with the departure 
of certain NGOs. However, from 2016 onwards, it received a new 
impetus with the arrival of South Sudanese refugees and Congolese 
returnees and the creation of the Meri Refugee Site. CNR enlarged 
its office and staff deployment in Aba, and NGOs multiplied. While 
some organizations have left Faradje over the years, a good number 
of them still remain. Historical cycles of violence and insecurity both 
in DRC and in South(ern) Sudan have resulted in internal and cross-
border displacement before. Nevertheless, the arrival of the LRA and 
consequent large population movements (both flight and return) 
brought a significant humanitarian presence that had never existed 
before in Faradje. While this presence of humanitarian actors has 
fluctuated over time (decreasing, increasing, changing in diversity), it 
has gradually become embedded in the political arena as a set of actors 
involved in the acquirement, management (including establishing 
socio-political entities such as returnee/refugee committees), 
decision-making, and distribution of humanitarian resources and 
public services.
 This humanitarian apparatus occupies a new space of 
authority next to existing forms of state and customary authority. 
UNHCR and NGOs established themselves in domains of public 
service provision, of which some are traditionally the responsibility 
of state and customary authorities. In the aftermath of the LRA 
and during the return of displaced communities, (re)construction 
of private and public infrastructure as well as rebuilding people’s 
livelihoods proved difficult. While Haut-Uélé, including Faradje, 
already suffered from “a history of gradual economic, political and 
physical marginalization and degradation,” the LRA conflict further 
entrenched this process (Titeca 2019: 219, 230). 
 In Faradje, local inhabitants (including returnees) stated that 
they had limited confidence in local state and customary authorities to 
provide the necessary resources to respond to the challenges brought 
about by (the impact of) displacement (including the forced return 
of Congolese refugees). The presence of humanitarian organizations 
and their resources were therefore deemed very valuable by both local 
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and displaced communities, as well as local Congolese authorities. 
This wide variety of socio-political entities soliciting for humanitarian 
resources produced a very dynamic political landscape in Faradje. 
There are many modes of interaction between these different forms 
of authority, humanitarian actors, and different communities, which 
at times proved complicated and fraught with conflicts and distrust. 
Two issues particularly complicated this relationship: participation 
in humanitarian decision-making and the uneven division of 
resources distributed to different categories of people impacted by 
displacement and return.
 Local authorities, civil society actors, and committees 
representing returnees, refugees, and IDPs complained about 
their lack of participation in decisions that would impact their 
communities. A local authority in Aba, for example, explained how he 
had been invited by UNHCR and one of its implementing partners to 
the opening ceremony of a school established for returnees and other 
populations, without ever having been substantially included in the 
development of the project.26 Also, the aforementioned committees 
were frequently in conflict with humanitarian agencies and the CNR 
about their role in the management and implementation of assistance 
and resources (see below). 
 Further, the available resources that UNHCR and its 
implementing and operating partners were able to provide were not 
nearly sufficient to answer the needs of different communities. The 
unequal division of these resources to different categories of refugees, 
the “host population,” IDPs, and returnees, moreover, added 
to these tensions. While South Sudanese refugees were receiving 
food rations and NFI’s in the newly established Meri refugee site, 
Congolese returnees who had accompanied them during their flight 
from South Sudan were neglected due to their ‘spontaneous return’. 
While the category of “host population” in areas of refugee presence 
was entitled to 20% of the refugee response budget, local inhabitants 
and customary authorities said that they received very little of it. 
Humanitarian aid in the remaining IDP camps existed, though it was 
also limited.
 The case of the establishment of Meri can be used here to 
illustrate the complex and fraught nature of political interactions 
between the different actors, authorities, and communities involved 
in the managing and soliciting of humanitarian resources. 
 The customary chief who had successfully solicited the 
established of the camp (and its humanitarian resources) in his 
chefferie quickly entered in conflict with locals and IDPs already 
living in the area. The settlement of South Sudanese refugees thus 
coincided with the displacement of the local (IDP) population who 
was simply told to move their homesteads and agricultural activities 
elsewhere. In response, the local communities later challenged the 
chief’s authority by reporting problems related to the refugee site, 
including about land and natural resources, to UNHCR instead of 
to him, despite his authority over such matters.27 The eagerness of 
the chief to solicit the refugee site’s presence in his chefferie without 
taking his population into account thus also resulted in decreasing 
the legitimacy of his authority in the eyes of his constituencies.
 Meri also merits attention as an illustration of the 
entanglement between the politics of the South Sudanese refugee 
and Congolese returnee committees in their dealings with the 
CNR and humanitarian agencies. Several returnees interviewed for 
this project complained that they received little to no assistance, 
while refugees living in nearby Meri refugee site did receive such 
assistance. A returnee said: “We were not welcomed upon return. 
They only cared about the South Sudanese refugees and abandoned 
us.”28 Humanitarian actors confirmed such frustration, and said 
their attempts to explain it by pointing at the different legal status 
of returnees, compared to refugees or official repatriates, did not 
change the frustration.29 As such, many returnees explained to have 
limited confidence in their authorities to improve their situation: 
“they cannot do anything for us.”30 Interlocutors often said that the 
returnees understudy “sont rentrés chez eux” (have returned home), 
which would justify the Congolese authorities’ negligence towards 
them.31 As Congolese returnees felt ignored and disadvantaged 
compared to refugees, they tried to benefit from the assistance 
provided to refugees. An unconfirmed number of 1000 Congolese 
returnees were said to be secretly registered in the refugee settlement 
in order to secure a means of survival.32 Additionally, several hundred 
Congolese wives of South Sudanese refugees were registered on arrival 
as beneficiaries, but were later deactivated for cash distribution in 
October 2018.33 Open protest and clashes between South Sudanese 
(with silent backing from Congolese) and humanitarian actors 
ensued, resulting in injuries and intervention by security services and 
in a decision to cut cash support for the entire camp for four months. 
Previous existing frictions between the South Sudanese refugee 
committee and the camp authorities (CNR and humanitarian 
partners) over insufficient assistance were further compounded by 
these events. Following the clashes, the CNR replaced the elected 
refugee committee with a temporary one, and later commanded 
the imprisonment of the former committee members, banning 
them as well from upcoming committee elections. The Congolese 
returnee committee and local civil society supported the former 
South Sudanese refugee committee in their conflict with the camp 
authorities, as all of them had experienced their own frustrations 
with the interventions and working methods of the CNR and 
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humanitarians. Civil society in Aba even demanded the removal of 
humanitarian staff and threatened to impose roadblocks.34 
 Meanwhile, the suspended refugee committee members 
(and the civil society) returned the favor by backing the Congolese 
returnee committee whose conflict with TSF over a project providing 
cash assistance to a part of the returnee population escalated. When 
humanitarian assistance or livelihood projects for returnees were 
carried out, the limited number of beneficiaries and allegations of 
corruption further fueled frustration among returnees and friction 
with humanitarian and state authorities. The program providing 
cash assistance resulted in disagreements about the nature and 
beneficiaries of the project, and in tensions between the NGO 
involved and the committee of returnees. Both accused the other of 
not being open to dialogue and requested the removal of the other 
party. Only after mediation from the territory administrator was a 
temporary settlement found.35  A member of the returnee committee 
said that such problems impacted on their relations with authorities 
and their constituencies: “Unfortunately, our committee is not well 
perceived by humanitarians and state authorities, because every time 
we intervene in meetings with humanitarians, our recommendations 
and proposals are not taken into considerations. As a consequence, 
even our brothers, the spontaneous returnees, think that it is us, the 
committee, who block assistance.”36
 Finally, the lack of humanitarian assistance for returnees 
also drew in the involvement of the camp authorities in Nyori. The 
returnees’ desperate need for resources prompted some of them to 
answer calls from the remaining refugee committee in Nyori camp 
to collect humanitarian assistance by traveling back to South Sudan. 
Some returnees went back to collect food and non-food (NFI) items 
on specially organized distributions of assistance for Congolese; 
others continued their schooling in Nyori while living in DRC or 
answered the recruitment calls for nurses in Nyori by preparing 
their departure. After one specially organized distribution of NFI’s 
in March 2018, South Sudanese combatants kidnapped a group 
of former refugees on their return to DRC. Military guarding the 
border closed it to prevent other incidents and refused to heed the 
request by the South Sudanese camp authorities and the president of 
the aforementioned refugee committee to reopen the border.37 This 
example equally illustrates how the South Sudanese camp authorities 
continue to exert their influence over the Congolese returnees who 
were never formally repatriated and who find themselves in desperate 
need of resources for survival.
CHANGING POLITICAL CONSTELLATIONS
The various forms of displacement in Faradje territory and the 
ensuing humanitarian presence also transformed existing political 
geographies and created new socio-political entities that encompass 
new forms of power and authority.
 The establishment of new polities in the form of refugee and 
IDP camps has created new political geographies encompassing new 
forms of power and authority. In a context of displacement, camps 
bring about new population concentrations, forms of organization, 
leadership positions, and a mixture of opportunities and challenges 
for the communities already living in the area. In Faradje, the 
presence of IDPs or returned refugees in certain areas has increased 
while simultaneously leaving many villages empty as large groups of 
displaced people have not (yet) returned to their original homes. Due 
to their protracted nature, some of the IDP camps that continue to 
exist have managed to de facto elevate their rank to that of a locality 
with their leaders taking up responsibilities similar to that of a 
customary chief. In his chapter on justice and security provision in 
Haut-Uélé, Titeca explains how this often creates political tensions 
over authority both in the areas that people fled to (between the (new) 
chief of the displaced and the customary leader of the “host” area) 
and that they fled from (between the displaced chief and emerging 
forms of power in his area of origin) (Titeca 2019: 299). 
 Further, in the context of displacement, these new population 
concentrations also attracted humanitarian resources, including new 
infrastructure and assistance. Health centers, schools, and shelters 
were constructed where they had been destroyed in the areas from 
which people had come. This increased humanitarian presence also 
impacted the political landscape in Faradje. In the groupement of 
Djabir, for example, the majority of the population of approximately 
11 villages had fled the LRA atrocities to another locality where many 
of them still reside today. Following their arrival, the chief of this 
locality then moved his residence closer to the NGO offices coming 
in to assist the displaced and struck deals with the chiefs of those 
communities to receive a percentage of the fees generally paid to the 
latter by their populations to mediate in conflicts. He oversaw the 
construction of schools and medical infrastructure by humanitarian 
agencies in his locality and received their financial support.38 Another 
customary chief managed to use the establishment of an IDP camp 
in his locality (and thus the increase of population, responsibilities, 
and humanitarian resources) to now present himself as the chief 
of a groupement, a more important political entity. In other sites, 
representatives of the displaced community have assumed roles 
similar to those of a customary chief. 
 Apart from enabling new political geographies, “conflict and 
displacement continuously create new combinations of power and 
authority” (Titeca 2019: 229). The humanitarian system operates 
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through a different set of socio-political entities than state and 
customary authorities. Humanitarian structures of displacement gave 
way to a range of committees representing returnees, South Sudanese 
refugees, and IDPs. UNHCR and CNR facilitate the election of such 
representative structures of refugees and IDPs to ensure ‘beneficiary’ 
participation in refugee and IDP camp management issues. The 
returnee committee, however, was created by returnees in 2016 and 
consisted of former members of the successive refugee committees 
that had existed during exile in Nyori. Interestingly, the returnee 
committee was specifically created in order to secure representation 
towards the incoming NGOs and make claims to assistance. They 
wrote letters and had meetings with CNR and TSF, were involved in 
the registration process of returnees, and attempted to influence the 
distribution of humanitarian resources. 
 Such committees are well placed to employ their categorical 
statuses (of refugee, returnee, IDP) to claim assistance, rights, and 
recognition as ‘vulnerable parties in need of help.’ Yet, while such 
committees are important political actors to be reckoned with, their 
relatively low hierarchical status in the humanitarian structures also 
increases their vulnerability. The refugee committees for Congolese 
in Nyori and South Sudanese in Meri had both been suspended and 
replaced, respectively, after interests about repatriation and protests 
against the deactivation of assistance for Congolese wives of South 
Sudanese refugees. Also, the legitimacy and role of the returnee 
committee were called into question by TSF and UNHCR after 
tensions arose with humanitarian partners around a project for cash 
distribution to a group of returnees (cf. supra).
 Further, such committees, at times, enter into competition 
with already existing authorities. Both want to be involved in 
negotiations over the distribution of assistance and other resources 
and claim representation of overlapping communities (e.g., residents 
of a locality of which many are also returnees). Such competition 
over authority also exists between customary and state authorities on 
the one hand and leadership positions that are remnants of refugee 
life in South Sudan, such as former camp and block leaders. Some 
Congolese had never been in leadership positions before they were 
elected as Nyori’s camp president, refugee committee members, 
or refugee block leaders. Displacement in this way also carried the 
potential of reconfiguring people’s place in society upon return from 
exile. Further, on the basis of their identification as a distinct category 
of ‘returnees,’ current representative committees and former refugee 
leaders exercise a form of (officially) apolitical agency in their 
relationship with the humanitarian system, which is different from 
the existing political roles exercised by customary and other local 
leaders. In practice, of course, both political and apolitical spaces 
infringe on each other and are significantly entangled.
CONCLUSION
This research brief has argued that the political/humanitarian 
structures that were established during displacement have a 
continuous impact on the political situation in Faradje, and contribute 
to transforming issues of authority and legitimacy and changing 
political constellations. Since the advent of the LRA atrocities, 
displacement has resulted in an increased humanitarian presence 
unprecedented in the history of Faradje. Although the humanitarian 
apparatus is officially apolitical, this paper demonstrated that it has a 
distinct impact on the political landscape. 
 The humanitarian apparatus produced new political 
geographies and socio-political entities that infringe on already 
existing political structures, at times resulting in conflict and 
friction between the two. Being able to claim, direct, distribute, and 
manage humanitarian resources has become a source of legitimacy 
and authority. As local authorities proved unable to support and 
integrate returnees and contribute to reconstruction, returnees 
and other population groups attempt to find a place into the same 
humanitarian structures that governed them during exile or that 
were established during displacement. Furthermore, the continuous 
influence exerted by South Sudanese camp authorities encourages 
returnees in desperate need of resources to find help and assistance in 
Nyori, which recurrently proved to be a dangerous enterprise.
 Dynamics concerning the lack of organization and assistance 
in the repatriation process continue to impact relationships between 
Congolese authorities, humanitarian actors, and returnees. Although 
the time-span of the research does not allow the authors to make 
conclusive arguments on how profoundly the negative experiences 
of these actors before, during and after the return process have 
impacted enduring processes of legitimacy and authority, it is clear 
that they still play a role in how these parties perceive each other(‘s 
actions). Certainly, the political impact of return in Faradje is as 
much connected to histories of exile and displacement as to the actual 
return and reintegration process that followed.
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ENDNOTES
1  The official statistics of registered returnees from South Sudan in 
December 2018 stands at 11,572. Interview with CNR official, Aba, 
25 February 2019.
2  For more information on the 2016 renewed upsurge in conflict, 
see among others: ACLED, 2016, ‘Country Report: South Sudan 
Conflict Update July 2016’; Réseau pour la réforme du secteur de 
sécurité et de justice, 2016, ‘Haut-Uélé: les réfugiés du Sudan du 
Sud d’Aba manquent de nourriture’.
3  Interview with 3 members of the returnee committee, Aba, 20 
March 2019.
4  For discussions on why and in which political context the LRA 
relocated to northeast DRC, see for example Schomerus, The 
Lord’s Resistance Army in Sudan; Le Sage, “Countering the Lord’s 
Resistance Army in Central Africa”.
5  Garamba National Park borders with South Sudan in the north 
and partly overlaps with the territories of Faradje in the east and 
with Dungu in the west.
6 HRW, 2009, The Christmas massacres. LRA attacks on civilians 
in northern Congo; Kristof Titeca & Theophile Costeur, 2014, ‘An 
LRA for everyone: how different actors frame the Lord’s Resistance 
Army’, African Affairs, 114/454, 92-114.
7  For a more profound analysis of the reaction of Congolese 
security forces towards the LRA and local populations, see: Titeca 
& Costeur, ‘An LRA for everyone’.
8  For discussions on the broader histories of trade, (forced) 
migration and cultural linkages in the regional borderlands of 
northeast DRC, northwest Uganda and the Equatoria region in 
current South Sudan, see for example: Leopold, Inside West Nile; 
Omasombo, Haut-Uélé; Meagher, “The hidden economy”.
9  See International Refugee Rights Initiative, Conflict Research 
Group, Actions Pour la Promotion Rurale, Groupe d’Etudes sur 
les Conflicts et la Sécurité (2019). Returning to Stability? Refugee 
Returns in the Great Lakes Region.
10  Interview with Congolese informant, Aba 25 February and 
25 March 2019. Officials who were involved in these pre-return 
discussions and who were contacted by the research team were 
generally hesitant to provide much information about the details 
and particularities of the process. Despite multiple requests, also 
UNHCR also did not share its version of this process. The apparent 
sensitivity of the topic was, due to time constraints, unfortunately 
not explored during field research. For this reason, also the extent 
to which South Sudanese authorities were involved in these 
discussions, is not clear.
11  Interview with CNR official, Aba, 25 & 26 January 2019.
12  Interview with CNR official, Aba, 28 March 2019; interview 
with head of CNR, Kinshasa, 15 August 2019. 
13  Interview with military official, Aba; Interview with returnees, 
Aba, 22 & 24 February 2019.
14  Interview with 3 members of the returnee committee, Aba, 20 
March 2019; interview with civil society, Aba, 20 March 2019.
15  Important: returnees were provided with food assistance for 
the first time since it was cut in 2017 just after the fieldwork was 
concluded in May 2019.
16  FGD with returnees, locality of Banga, 26 March 2019.
17  Interview with returnees, Aba, 27 February 2019 and 26 March 
2019, with NGO representative, Aru, 23 March 2019, and with 
customary leader, Kakwa-Ima, 25 March 2019. 
18  Interview with the chief of Kakwa-Ima, 3 March 2019; 
Interview with Terre Sans Frontières (TSF), Aru, 23 March 2019; 
Focus Group Discussion with returnees from the chefferie Kakwa-
Ima, 26 March 2019.
19  i.e. the refugee leadership, re-elected by camp inhabitants every 
few years under supervision of the CRA and UNHCR.
20  Interviews with former CNR official, 25 February 2019; and 
with returnees, Aba, 22 & 23 February, 20 March 2019. Quote 
from 20 March. Actors in South Sudan were not contacted for this 
research however to verify these claims.
21  According to several returnees, the main reason why many 
refugees had requested repatriation was the ever declining 
humanitarian assistance in the camp and thus aggravating 
living conditions. The increasing security in DRC was a factor 
too, though of a lesser extent. Refugees who had succeeded in 
establishing successful income-generating activities or those with 
criminal records back in DRC were said to prefer their stay in South 
Sudan. 
22  Authorities even briefly detained former committee members 
who were in support of repatriation when the governor of the then 
Province Orientale wanted to visit the camp in 2012. Interviews 
with returnees, Aba, 23 & 25 February 2019.
23  Interview with 3 members of the returnee committee, Aba, 
20 March 2019; Interview with Terre Sans Frontières (TSF), Aru, 
23 March 2019; Interview with the chief of Kakwa-Ima, Aba, 
25 March 2019; Interview with CNR official, 25 March 2019; 
Interview with returnees and customary chief, Banga, 26 March 
2019.
24  Meeting with UNHCR and TSF, Aru, 21 June 2019.
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25  Interview with CNR official, Aba, 28 March 2019; Interview 
with returnees, Aba, 26 March 2019.
26  Conversation with local authority, Aba, 20 March 2019.
27  Interview with local leader, Meri, 25 March 2019. 
28  Interview with returnee, Aba, 23 February 2019. 
29  Interviews with humanitarian actors, Aru, 23 March 2019 & 
Aba, 28 March 2019.
30  Interview with returnees, 26 March 2019.
31  Interview with military official, Aba; Interview with 
returnees, Aba, 22 & 24 February 2019.
32  Reference to discourse governor province, 8 December 2018. 
33  The rest of the Congolese did not face suspension of their 
status as they had officially registered themselves as South 
Sudanese.
34  Interview with CNR, Aba, 22 March 2019; Interviews with 
members of the former South Sudanese refugee committee 
on 24 February, 27 & 28 March; information from Congolese 
informants between 14-25 May, 10 June, July 2019.
35  Interviews with civil society, Aba, 20 March 2019 and 
Kurukwata, 4 March 2019; with CNR, Aba, 21 March 2019; 
with NGO, Aru, 22 March 2019; and with returnees, Aba, 17 
April 2019.
36  Interview with returnee committee, Aba, 17 April 2019.
37  Interviews with military and with returnees present during 
the incident, 26 March 2019. 
38  Conversations with Congolese informant, Arua, 18-20 June 
2019.
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